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Serendipitous Timing: The
Coincidental Emergence of the
New Brain Science and the Advent
of an Epistemological Approach to
Determining the Admissibility of
Expert Testimony
by Edward J. Imwinkelried'

"Mind is the great leveler of all things."
-Daniel Webster'
This is an exciting time for students of the human brain. Worldwide
there has never been such intense interest in and extensive research into
the brain. Techniques for studying the brain are proliferating. By way
of example, one group of scientists is employing electroencephalography
(EEG) as a tool to investigate the brain's operations.2 Some of these
researchers have utilized EEG to identify brain damage; others,
including Dr. Lawrence Farwell of Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories,
are endeavoring to adapt EEG technology to the detection of deception.'
Another group of scientists has focused its research on BOLD fMRI
(Blood Oxygen Level Dependent functional Magnetic Resonance

* Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California Davis School of
Law. University of San Francisco (BA., 1967; J.D., 1969).
1. DANIEL WEBSTER, THE BUNKER HILL MONUMENT ORATIONS 22 (Albert F. Blaisdell
ed., Clark & Maynard 1885).
2. FUNDAMENTAL NEUROSCIENCE 1389 (Michael Zigmond et al. eds. 1999).
3. See, e.g., BRAIN FINGERPRINTING LABORATORIES, www.brainwavescience.com/AboutFarwell.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2011).
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Imaging)." Some researchers at Washington University have adapted
the technique to identify the verbal center of patients' brains.' As in
the case of EEG, others, notably Cephos Corporation 6 and No-Lie MRI,7
are using fMRI as a type of lie detector. The volume of literature in the
area is growing exponentially. At the beginning of this century, there
were already several published research studies on fMRI alone.' The
forthcoming third edition of the Federal Judicial Center's Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence will include a chapter devoted to the
brain sciences.9
Although the mention of the courtroom use of brain science understandably brings to mind the possibility of introducing testimony based
on such science, the courtroom impact of brain science will not be limited
to its evidentiary use. The rules of evidence come into play when a
litigator uses information for an adjudicative purpose, that is, to help a
trier of fact decide the historical facts of the instant case.o If the
litigator proffers brain science data to help the trier determine the who,
what, which, when, where, and why of the pending case, the litigator
obviously must comply with formal evidentiary rules such as the
limitations on expert opinion testimony. The third part of this article
discusses several adjudicative uses of brain science data.
However, a litigator may put brain science information to other, very
different uses. For instance, the litigator may proffer the information for
the legislative or normative purpose of persuading the judge to formulate

4. See generally RICHARD B. BUXTON, INTRODUCTION TO FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC
RESONANCE IMAGING PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES (2002); Scorr A. HUETTEL ET AL.,
FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING (2004).

5. Gerry Everding, Better Imaging Helps Surgeons Avoid Damage to Language
Functions, NEWSROOM, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY ST. Louis, Nov. 4, 2003, http*//news.
wustl.edu/news/Pages/494.aspx.
6. CEPHOS CORP., http*J/www.cephoscorp.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2011).
7. No LIE MRI, INC., httpJ/noliemri.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2011).
8. For a listing of some of these studies, see Kathleen M. O'Craven & Nancy
Kanwisher, Mental Imagery ofFacesandPlacedActivates CorrespondingStimulus-Specific
Brain Regions, 12 J. COG. NEUROSCIENCE 1013 (2000).
9. The third edition of the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence is expected to be
issued in 2011. See COMM. ON SCIENCE, TECH., AND LAW, THE NAT'L ACADEMICS,
http//sites.nationalacademies.org/pga/stl/developmentmanualindex.htm (last visited Feb.
10, 2011).
10. See FED. R. EVID. 201 Advisory Committee's Note; Kenneth Culp Davis, A System
of JudicialNotice Based on Fairnessand Convenience, in PERSPECTIVES OF LAW: ESSAYS
FOR AUSTIN WAKEMAN Scorr 69, 87 (Roscoe Pound et al. eds. 1964) [hereinafter Davis, A
System); Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 404 (1942) [hereinafter Davis, An Approach]; Edward J.
Imwinkelried, Expert Testimony by Ethicists: What Should Be the Norm?, 76 TEMP. L. REV.
91, 114-18 (2003).
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a common-law rule,u determine the proper construction of a statute,1 2
or frame a constitutional doctrine.13 When the litigator puts information to a normative use, the formal rules of evidence are inapposite.14
As James Bradley Thayer famously put it, the formal rules are "the child
of the jury system;"" the common law developed the rules to compensate for lay jurors' supposed deficiencies in critically evaluating evidence.
Those policy concerns are inapplicable when the decision-maker is the
judge rather than the jury. If a judge is performing an essentially
legislative function, the technical evidentiary rules should not constrain
his or her ability to gather and consider relevant information. 6
In her presentation at this Symposium,. Professor Susan Bandes
discussed the propriety of imposing criminal responsibility for negligent
conduct." As she noted, some commentators have argued that criminal
sanctions ought to be imposed only for conduct involving "conscious
She argued that modern brain science undermines any
choice."
simplistic distinction between the conscious and the subconscious. More
specifically, she contended that to an extent persons can access their
subconscious and that consequently, the imposition of criminal sanctions
could influence and deter even negligent behavior.' 8 A litigator
pressing this argument on a judge would clearly be using brain science
data for a normative or legislative purpose and hence would not have to
comply with formal evidentiary strictures.
Those strictures, though, are the focus of this Article. This Article
deals with the adjudicative use of brain science data. At the same time
that the scientific community is concentrating more attention on brain
science, the legal community has been fashioning a new approach to
determining the admissibility of expert testimony, including testimony
based on the latest theories and techniques being developed by brain
scientists. In 1923 the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit rendered its famous decision in Frye v. United
States.'9 The court in Frye announced that to introduce testimony

11. See Davis, A System, supra note 10, at 87.
12. See id.; see also 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 10.6, at 154 (3d ed. 1994).
13. Davis, A System, supra note 10, at 87; Davis, An Approach, supra note 10, at 404.
14. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 114-27.
15. FED. R. EVID. 104 Advisory Committee's Note.
16. See id.; Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 114-18.
17. The Brain Sciences in the Courtroom, A Symposium of the Mercer Law Review, 62
MERCER L. REV. 769,811 (2011) (Susan Bandes's title in the Symposium program was The
Implications of Neuroscience for Criminal Negligence Liability).
18.

Id. at 815-17.

19. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

962

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

based on a scientific theory or technique, the proponent had to lay a
foundation establishing that the theory or technique had "gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."so Over the
course of the next half century, the general acceptance test evolved into
the overwhelming majority view in the United States.21 By the mid1970s the Frye test had become the governing standard in federal court
as well as in forty-five states.22
However, in 1993 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharamaceuticals,Inc.,'
the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the general
acceptance test was no longer good law in federal court.' The Court
reasoned that the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975
has impliedly overturned Frye.' The Court stated that the text of Rule
40226 had the effect of abolishing uncodified common-law exclusionary
rules of evidence.27 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun
professed that he could not find any statutory language that could
reasonably bear the interpretation that it preserved a general acceptance
test; instead, the Justice derived a new, empirical validation test from
the text of Rule 702.2 That rule refers to expert testimony based on
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. 2 9 Drawing on
several amicus briefs submitted by scientists and scientific organizations, the Justice adopted a methodological definition of the expression,
"scientific ... knowledge."3 o The proponent must show that the theory
or technique qualifies as "reliable" scientific knowledge.3 ' The decisive
question is whether the proponent has demonstrated that the expert's
theory or technique has been empirically validated, that is, whether it

20. Id. at 1014.
21. 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1.06, at
13 (4th ed. 2007).
22. Betty R. Steingass, Comment, Changingthe Standardfor theAdmissibility ofNovel
Scientific Evidence: State v. Williams, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 757, 769 (1979).
23. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
24. Id. at 597.
25. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597; see also FED. R. EVID. 702.
26. FED. R. EVID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or
by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.").
27. See Daubert,509 U.S. at 587-88; Edward J. Imwinkelried, FederalRule of Evidence
402: The Second Revolution, 6 REV. LITIG. 129, 129 (1987).
28. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-92.
29. FED. R. EvID. 702.
30. Daubert,509 U.S. at 589-90; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Daubert Decision:Frye
Is Dead, Long Live the Federal Rules of Evidence, 29 TRIAL, Sept. 1993, at 60, 62-63
(internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
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is supported by adequate, methodologically sound empirical data.32
Justice Blackmun listed several factors that trial judges could consider
in evaluating the reliability of the proffered testimony, but he also
stressed that "[tihe inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is . . . a flexible
one."33
The Supreme Court struck a similar note in 1997 in GeneralElectric
Co. v. Joiner' when it held that the trial judge enjoys considerable
discretion in applying the Daubertfactors to assess the reliability of the
testimony.35 Finally, in 1999 the Court completed its trilogy of expert
testimony decisions. In that year the Court handed down its decision in
Kumho 7Tre Co. v. Carmichael.36 In Kumho the Court addressed the
On the
admissibility of testimony based on nonscientific expertise.
one hand, acknowledging that square pegs do not fit into round holes,
the Court conceded that some of the factors listed in Daubert might be
inappropriate for gauging the admissibility of nonscientific expert
testimony.38 On the other hand, the Court insisted that regardless of
the species of expertise, the proponent of any expert testimony must
demonstrate its reliability.39 According to the Court, the term "knowledge" in Rule 702 is the source of the requirement for a showing of
reliability.o Whenever the proponent proffers expert testimony, the
proponent must demonstrate that the testimony rests on more than the
witness's ipse dixit claim that his or her theory or technique is trustworthy.4 1
The thesis of this Article is that it is serendipity that the courts have
developed this new approach to determining the admissibility of expert
testimony at roughly the same time that brain science is entering a new
era. The Article develops that thesis in three steps.
The first part of the Article describes the prior state of the law under
the Frye regime. This part argues that the general acceptance test is a
flawed approach to assessing the admissibility of expert testimony. At
best, general acceptance is a crude proxy for what should matter most
to the law, namely, whether by employing the theory or technique the
expert can accurately draw the inference he or she proposes testifying

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 592-93.
Id. at 593-95.
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
See id. at 146.
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Id. at 141.
Id. at 150.
See id. at 152.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 157.
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to. Further, most Frye jurisdictions recognized broad, amorphous
exemptions from the test for various types of expertise such as "soft
science." Consequently, the courts admitted many kinds of expertise
without subjecting the testimony to any meaningful scrutiny. If the
witness qualified as an expert4 and the subject was beyond the ken of
the average layperson,4 3 the judge did not scrutinize the underlying
theory or technique. The Frye jurisprudence would be an inept
framework for separating the wheat from the chaff in the new brain
sciences.
The second part of the Article contrasts the analytic framework that
is emerging in the Daubert-Joiner-Kumholine of authority. As we shall
see, at root this framework is an epistemological approach that requires
the trial judge to evaluate the warrant for the expert's knowledge claim.
This part attempts to synthesize the case law by arguing that to
properly apply this framework, the trial judge must address three
questions. The first question is which theory or technique; initially, the
judge must identify the specific theory or technique that the expert
contemplates utilizing. The question is not the global validity of the
expert's discipline. The next question is why the proponent is offering
the testimony about the theory or technique: What is the specific use
that the expert is putting the technique to? Once the proponent has
answered the which and why questions to the judge's satisfaction, the
judge can reach the ultimate issue: How should the proponent validate
that particular use of that theory or technique? In effect, the answers
to the which and why questions specify the hypothesis to be tested. The
judge then inquires whether the proponent has marshaled enough
methodologically sound empirical data to validate the hypothesis-an
essentially epistemological test. This part of the Article applies this
three-step framework to several types of expertise to demonstrate the
utility of the framework.
More to the point of this Symposium, the third part of the Article
turns to the question of whether this new analytic framework can be
used effectively to make sensible decisions about the admissibility of
testimony based on the emerging brain sciences. This part draws on the
literature on EEG and BOLD fMRI to illustrate that the framework is
sufficiently flexible and powerful to help the courts resolve the admissibility issues posed by advances in brain science.

42. FED. R. EVID. 702 ("a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training,or education").
43. Id. ("assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or ... determine a fact in
issue").
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FRYE'S FLAWED APPROACH TO DETERMINING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
ExPERT TESTIMONY

General Acceptance as a Proxy for Reliability
Frye v. United States" is a remarkable opinion. The opinion consists
of only two pages, and in those two pages the court neither cited
authority nor advanced any policy rationale for the general acceptance
test it enunciated." Of course, the common law has a tremendous
capacity for post hoc rationalization. Several courts that later adopted
Frye demonstrated that capacity by proposing a rationale for the original
decision in Frye. The California courts defended the rationale that the
trial judge ought to confine his or her inquiry to determining whether
the theory was generally accepted because, as a layperson, the judge was
incompetent to resolve a true battle between scientists. The same courts
expressed skepticism about the jury's capacity to critically evaluate
scientific testimony.'
The Frye test did not merely counsel general deference to the scientific
community. Rather, it amounted to a formal delegation of the admissibility decision to that community. In United States v. Addison," a
1974 decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, the court declared "[tihe requirement of general acceptance in

A.

44. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
45. GIANNELLi & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 21, § 1.06, at 13. See generally Paul C.
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A HalfCentury Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980).
46. See generally People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976). To say the least, the
assumption ofjuror and judicial incompetence is debatable. In truth, the assumption is
at odds with most of the empirical investigations conducted to date. A 1989 survey article
concluded that "[tihe image of a spellbound jury mesmerized by ... a forensic expert is
more likely to reflect ... fantasies than the ... realities of courtroom testimony." Richard
Rogers & Charles Patrick Ewing, Ultimate Opinion Proscriptions:A Cosmetic Fix and a
Plea for Empiricism, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 357, 363 (1989). The most comprehensive
collection of the empirical data is probably the Brief for Neil Vidmar et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (No. 97-1709),
1998 WL 734434. After surveying the available studies, the brief concludes:
The Supreme Court's decision in this case should not be based on the Petitioners'
unsupported or flawed assertions that juries fail to critically evaluate expert
testimony, that they are overawed by experts, [or] that they have a "natural
tendency" to defer to experts[.] The heavy preponderance of data from more than
a quarter century of empirical jury research points to just the opposite view ofjury
behavior.
Brief for Neil Vidmar et al., at 25.
47. 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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the scientific community assures that those most qualified to assess the
general validity of a scientific method will have the determinative
voice."a In the same vein, in 1977 the Michigan Supreme Court
decided to continue to adhere to Frye." The court explained that under
Frye, the members of the relevant scientific specialities "[iln effect ...
form a kind of technical jury, which must first pass on the scientific
status of a [theory or technique]" before the jury can be exposed to the
theory or technique.o
The crux of the Frye approach was treating general acceptance as a
proxy or surrogate for the validity of the scientific theory or technique." However, the popularity of a theory does not guarantee its
scientific validity.5 2 As Thomas Kuhn convincingly documented," the
history of science is replete with examples of dominant paradigms that
were shattered by later empirical research. Nor does the novelty of a
theory-fatal to admissibility under Frye--dictate the conclusion that the
theory or technique is invalid. In many instances, again by virtue of
meticulous empirical research, "yesterday's [scientific] heresy becom[es]
tomorrow's conventional wisdom."' Ultimately, it became evident that
general acceptance was a failed, crude proxy for scientific validity and
accuracy. 5
In rejecting Frye, the Georgia Supreme Court wrote
disparagingly that the general acceptance test was reducible to "counting

48. Id. at 743-44.
49. People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194-95 (Mich. 1977).
50. Id. at 194.
51. Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert' A New Search for
ScientificKnowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715,725 (1994). The distinguished physicist, Richard
Feynman, has observed:
When someone says, "Science teaches such and such," he is using the word
incorrectly. Science doesn't teach anything; experience teaches it. If they say to
you, "Science has shown such and such," you [should] ask, "How does science show
it? How did the scientists find out? How? What? Where?". . . And you have as
much right as anyone else, upon hearing about the experiments (but be patient
and listen to all the evidence) to judge whether a sensible conclusion has been
arrived at.
Richard Feynman, What Is Science?, 7 PHYsics TEACHER 313, 320 (1969) (emphasis
omitted).
52. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits JurassicPark:The Far-Reaching
Implication of the Daubert Court's Recognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific
Enterprise,81 IOWA L. REV. 55, 60 (1995).
53. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d
ed. 1970).
54. Brief for Physicians, Scientists, and Historians of Science as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 15, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1992) (No. 92-102),
1992 WL 12006437.
55. Black, supra note 51, at 725.
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heads."5 6 The validity of a theory should be determined by what
happens in a research laboratory, not by a show of hands at a scientific
convention.
B. The Exemptions from the Scope of the General Acceptance Test for
Soft Science and Nonscientific Expertise
There are not only grave concerns about the wisdom of using general
acceptance as the litmus test for admissibility; there are also serious
questions about the scope of the test. Perhaps in part because of
nagging doubts about the wisdom of the test, many Frye jurisdictions
have carved out exceptions to the test's ambit." For instance, although
the California Supreme Court has vigorously championed Frye, in People
v. McDonald5 8 the same court adamantly refused to apply Frye to
psychological testimony about the supposed unreliability of eyewitness
identifications.5 9 The court acknowledged that it subscribed to Frye out
of a belief that lay "jurors tend to ascribe an inordinately high degree of
certainty" to scientific testimony.6 0 However, the court stated that the
risk of jury overvaluation is a significant concern only when the
purported scientific "evidence is produced by a machine."6 The court
observed, "We have never applied the ... Frye rule to expert medical

testimony, even when the witness is a psychiatrist and the subject
matter is as esoteric as the reconstitution of a past state of mind or the
prediction of future dangerousness[.]'
In another case, the same
California court proclaimed that Frye applies only to "the direct product
of a mechanical device such as a lie detector."" This limitation,
restricting Frye to instrumental scientific techniques, has a wide
following.'
"[Miany courts" embraced that restriction," and there

56. Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 525, 292 S.E.2d 389, 395 (1982).
57. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Attempts to Limit the Scope of the Frye Standardfor the
Admission of Scientific Evidence: Confronting the Real Cost of the GeneralAcceptance Test,
10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 441, 446-48 (1992).
58. 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984).
59. Id. at 723-24.
60. Id. at 724.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1368 (Cal. 1982).
64. See generally People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1987); State v. Oslund, 469
N.W.2d 489, 494-95 (Minn. App. 1991); State v. Young, 802 P.2d 829, 836 (Wash. App.
1991) (an expert's "clinical findings"); Linda Robertson, The Kelly-Frye Rule, 4 CALIF.
DEFENDER 50,51 (1990-1991) (listing techniques which the California courts have indicated
are "not subject to" the Frye rule); Ralph Slovenko, Syndrome Evidence in Establishinga
Stressor, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 443, 465 n.23 (1984) (the Frye rule "at times [is] not
applied to the testimony of medical experts or psychologists").
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was a discernible trend toward "narrowing Frye's applicability."' One
relatively comprehensive survey of Frye case law concluded that this
restriction was "[tihe majority view."
Even more fundamentally, most Frye jurisdictions apply the test only
to purportedly scientific testimony. Prior to Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc." and Kumho lre Co. v. Carmichael," doubts
about the reliability of nonscientific expert testimony went "largely
unregarded" by the courts.o Most jurisdictions balked at applying Frye
to nonscientific expert testimony.7 The courts adopted a virtually
laissez-faire attitude toward the reliability of propositions underlying
nonscientific expert testimony.7 2 As in the case of soft science, the
courts demanded a twofold foundational showing that the witness
qualifies as an expert and that the testimony would be helpful to the
However, beyond that minimal showing, the courts
trier of fact."
tended to uncritically accept a nonscientific expert's claim that the
proposition he or she proposes testifying to is reliable." For the most
part, the courts failed to enforce any objective," articulable" standards to determine the admissibility of opinions based on nonscientific
expertise. In a recent case, the California Supreme Court bypassed the
opportunity to modify or clarify the breadth of that state's exemption for
nonscientific testimony."
Like the general acceptance test itself, these exemptions were of
dubious wisdom. The proponents of the exemptions sometimes defended

65. 2 GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE
FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES § 51.5, at 21 (1987).
66. Id. at 23; see People v. Cegers, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 297 (Cal Ct. App. 1992); Campbell
v. People, 814 P.2d 1, 8 (Colo. 1991) (in Colorado, Frye applied only to "novel scientific
devices or processes involving the evaluation of physical evidence. . .").
67. Roger S. Hanson, James Alphonzo Frye Is Sixty-Five Years Old,; Should He Retire?,
16 W. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 411 (1989).
68. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
69. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
70. John W. Strong, Language and Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert
Testimony by Restrictions of Function, Reliability, and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 361
(1992).
71. Hanson, supra note 67, at 411.
72. Strong, supra note 70, at 361.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 361-62.
75. Id. at 366.
76. Id. at 362.
77. In re Lockheed Litig. Cases, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); see
Edward J. Imwinkelried & David L. Faigman, Evidence Code Section 802: The Neglected
Key to Rationalizing the CaliforniaLaw of Expert Testimony, 42 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 427
(2008).
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the exemptions on the ground that testimony based on hard science has
a much greater impact on the jury than testimony based on soft science
or nonscientific expertise. However, that claim is highly speculative. In
a 1981 article and trial advocacy text intended primarily for practicing
attorneys, the Author conjectured that lay jurors might be more
skeptical of noninstrumental expert testimony.78 The Author speculated that in the case of soft science, lay factfinders might think that rather
than depending upon "sophisticated instruments capable of precise"
measurement, 9 the value of the expert's opinion turns on "the subjective, personal judgment of the witness.'" Although those statements
were sheer conjecture, that conjecture was repeated in a 1987 article
that has become the most widely cited secondary authority on the
admissibility of nontraditional psychological evidence such as syndrome
testimony.8 ' The 1987 article contended that such evidence should be
exempt from the Frye test.82 The article asserted that unlike testimony
about instrumental techniques, evidence based on "software" theories is
"not likely to elicit unquestioning juror acceptance."' As support for
that proposition, the article cited only the previous 1981 article and
cases such as People v. McDonald' indulging in similar speculation.'
The reality, though, is neither the 1981 article nor the 1987 article
pointed to any empirical studies bearing out the speculation.'
Common sense suggests that testimony based on nonscientific
expertise poses at least as great a danger of unreliability as testimony
based on science. One of the great strengths of the scientific method is
that it permits other scientists to later attempt to duplicate the earlier

78. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law and Tacticsfor the ProponentsofScientific
Evidence, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 33, 64 (Edward J. Imwinkelried ed., 2d ed.
1981); Edward J.Imwinkelried,A New Era in the EvolutionofScientific Evidence-A Primer
on Evaluatingthe Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 261, 283 (1981).
79. Imwinkelried, A New Era, supra note 78, at 283.
80. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law and Tactics, supra note 78, at 63-64.
81. David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and OtherMental Exotica:A New Approach to
the Admissibility of NontraditionalPsychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L.
REV. 19, 85-86 (1987).
82. Id. at 86-87.
83. Id. at 85-86.
84. 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984).
85. McCord, supranote 81, at 86 n.311. In People v. McDonald, the court asserted that
lay jurors have "a healthy skepticism" about psychological testimony. 690 P.2d at 724
(citing no empirical support for its assertion).
86. See Melvin B. Lewis, The Element of Subjectivity in InterpretingInstrumental Test
Results, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 78, at 409, 424-28.
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test to see whether they can replicate the test result. 7 That facet of
scientific methodology enabled subsequent researchers to debunk the
infamous "cold fusion" claims by recreating the experiment and reaching
a very different result. For the most part, that doublecheck is unavailable in the case of nonscientific expertise." The upshot is that the
concerns about the unreliability of soft science and nonscientific
expertise are every bit as significant as the doubts relating to hard
science. As Professor Giannelli has written, "[tihere is little justification
... for exempting these techniques from close scrutiny," because "[t]heir
reliability is often questionable.
These concerns are substantial because a large percentage of the
expert testimony presented at trial falls into the categories that are
exempt from Frye. During the Chicago Jury Project conducted in the
1960s, the researchers attempted to determine the types of expert
witnesses called at trial. As previously stated, in McDonald the
California Supreme Court indicated that it classifies medicine as soft
science.90 In the Chicago study, 43% of the experts called as witnesses
were physicians.91 Another 6% were police officers or FBI agents
providing nonscientific expert testimony on subjects such as the modus
operandi of criminals." In a Rand Corporation study in the 1980s,
roughly half of the expert witnesses were physicians." Nonscientific
expert witnesses accounted for another 9% of the court appearances.94
At this point, it is difficult to predict how Frye jurisdictions will
classify the new techniques being developed by the brain sciences.
Because some techniques such as fMRI are heavily dependent on
instrumentation, the courts should subject some of the techniques to the
general acceptance test. However, even that is not a foregone conclusion
given the court's statement in McDonald that it had never applied Frye
to medical testimony." Frye jurisdictions have struggled over such

87.

See JOHN ZIMAN, RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE: AN EXPLORATION OF THE GROUNDS FOR

BELIEF IN SCIENCE 60, 63-64, 68, 75 (1978); see also Rockne P. Harmon & Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The Admissibilility of Prosecution Evidence that the Defense Had the
Opportunity to Retest the PhysicalEvidence that Was Analyzed by a Government Expert,
37 N.E. J. CRiM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT (forthcoming 2011).
88. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert- Developing a Similarly
EpistemologicalApproach to Ensuringthe ReliabilityofNonscientificExpert Testimony, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2280 (1994).
89. 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 21, § 1.06(c], at 25.
90. See 690 P.2d at 723-24.
91.

HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 140 (1966).

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIs. L. REv. 1113, 1119 (1991).
Id.
690 P.2d at 724.
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questions as whether rape trauma syndrome falls within an exemption
from the general acceptance test. 6 The jurisdictions have sometimes
experienced considerable difficulty drawing the lines between hard
science, soft science, and nonscientific expertise. Thus, there is a
possibility that a number of Frye states will admit testimony based on
some of the new brain science methodologies without requiring a
showing of general acceptance. Further, as we have seen, even if the
court elects to insist on that showing, general acceptance is only a rough,
crude proxy for the real question: whether the theory or technique in
question will enable the expert to accurately draw the inference to which
he or she proposes testifying. Fortunately, the new analytic approach
emerging post-Daubert gives the courts better tools for getting at that
question.
II.

THE NEW EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH TO DETERMINING THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

In 1993 the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc." The Daubert line of authority differs from
the Frye v. United States98 regime in two fundamental respects.
A. Negatively, the Cases in the Daubert Line of Authority Reject the
Exemptions Recognized Under Frye
As the introduction noted, in his opinion in Daubert Justice Blackmun
addressed the meaning of "scientific ...

knowledge" in Rule 702."

Justice Blackmun noted that there had been a controversy over the
"proper scope" of Frye.10o However, he adopted a classically Newtonian, broad description of the process of formulating a hypothesis and then
engaging in controlled laboratory experimentation or systematic field
observation to either validate or falsify the hypothesis. 01 It was
immediately clear to the lower courts that the Justice had prescribed an
expansive definition, seemingly applying to both hard and soft science.
Indeed, contrast to People v. McDonald,02 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Daubert test applied to
expert psychological testimony about the supposed unreliability of

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 21, § 9.04[al, at 530.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
509 U.S. at 589-90.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 590.
690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984).
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eyewitness identificationl 0 3-the very type of expert testimony McDonald exempted from the general acceptance test." It quickly became
the prevailing view that Daubert had terminated the exemption that soft
science had formerly enjoyed under Frye.os In many cases it will be
more difficult to adapt scientific methodology to test propositions in the
domain of soft science," but that is an inadequate excuse for utterly
abandoning the tradition of empirical investigation in that domain.
The question persisting after Daubert was whether there was still an
exemption for nonscientific expertise. The advocates of that exemption
presented two arguments. First, they pointed out that in Daubert,
Justice Blackmun had cautioned that "[olur discussion is limited to the
scientific context because that is the nature of the expertise offered
here."'
Second, Rule 702 is worded in the alternative, referring to
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge."os The wording
of the opinion and the statute made it plausible to argue that unlike the
exemption for soft science, the exemption for nonscientific expertise had
survived the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
However, in 1999 when the Supreme Court finally reached the merits
of the question in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,' the Court sounded
the deathknell for that exemption. Justice Breyer delivered the Court's
opinion, and in doing so he relied on both statutory construction and
1 0 As a matter
policy arguments.n
of statutory interpretation, Justice
Breyer believed that the key was the statute's use of the term "knowledge.""' It was true that the statute employed three different adjectives to modify that noun. However, regardless of whether the expertise
was scientific, technical, or specialized in character, the witness's
testimony had to be based on "knowledge.""
In Daubert Justice Blackmun separately commented on the meaning
of "knowledge" and "scientific," and he expressly stated that "the word
103. United States v. Amador-Galvan, 9 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1993).
104. 690 P.2d at 723.
105. Jennifer Sparks, Comment, Admissibility of Expert PsychologicalEvidence in the
Federal Courts, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1315, 1318 (1995); see also Klein v. Vanek, 86 F. Supp.
2d 812, 817 (N.D. M. 2000); William M. Grove & R. Christopher Barden, The Admissibility
of Testimony FromMental Health Experts Under Daubert/KumhoAnalyses, 5 PSYCH., PUB.
POL'Y & L. 224, 224-25 (1999).
106. See generally David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of
Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989).
107. 509 U.S. at 590 n.8.
108. FED. R. EvID. 702.
109. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
110. Id. at 141, 147-49.
111. Id. at 147-48.
112. Id.
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'knowledge' connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported
Justice Breyer ruled that Congress's inclusion of
speculation."'
"knowledge" in the statute mandated that all admissible expert
testimony "'have a reliable basis.'"" After advancing that statutory
construction argument, Justice Breyer discussed the policy question of
whether it would be feasible to formulate varying admissibility
standards for the different types of expertise proffered at trial." 5 In
his words, "[I]t would prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to
administer evidentiary rules under which a gatekeeping obligation
depended upon a distinction between 'scientific' knowledge and
'technical' or 'other specialized' knowledge. There is no clear line that
divides one from the others."" 6 The Court therefore declared that the
trial judge must assure that the proffered expert testimony is "reliable
...

whether the testimony reflects scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge.""'
The Court was realistic enough to appreciate that it is dangerous to
lump all expert testimony together. For that reason, after announcing
the general reliability requirement under Rule 702, Justice Breyer
distinguished between that requirement and the specific factors Justice
Blackmun had suggested that trial judges consider in assessing the
admissibility of expert testimony." Justice Breyer acknowledged that
many of those factors such as peer review were derived from the basic
model for scientific knowledge.H9 He stated that in a case involving
nonscientific expertise, one or some of those factors might be inappropriate.12 0 The Justice accorded "the trial judge . . . considerable leeway
in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether
particular expert testimony is reliable."121 Hence, the trial judge not
only possesses discretion in applying the Daubert factors to determine
the admissibility of purportedly scientific testimony;2 2 the judge also
enjoys latitude in selecting the factors to be employed as "reasonable
measures of reliability" in the case of other types of expertise."

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

590 U.S. at 590.
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 148 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 149.
See id. at 150-51.
Id. at 149-50.
Id. at 150-53.
Id. at 152.
See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153.
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Since the rendition of the decision in Daubert, commentators have
generated an enormous body of scholarship debating the question of
whether the Frye or Daubert standard is more rigorous.'" In Daubert
Justice Blackmun described the former standard as "rigid" and "austere"
while he characterized the Federal Rules as "liberal" and "permissive."'" Yet, by 2000, in Weisgram v. Marley Co.,1 26 the same Court
stated that Daubert decrees "exacting standards of reliability."l 27
However, it is a mistake to fixate on that issue; just as a court under
Frye could apply its standard in a liberal manner, a court following
Daubert might apply its test in a conservative fashion.'2 In the long
term, though, the question of the scope or reach of Daubert may prove
to be far more important than its rigor or strictness. In that regard, it
is undeniable that Daubert's across-the-board reliability requirement
applies to many types of expertise formerly exempt from scrutiny under
Frye.
B. Affirmatively, the Daubert-Joiner-Kumho Line ofAuthority Requires
the Courts to Adopt an EpistemologicalApproach, and thatApproach can
be Synthesized into a Three-Step Analysis
In Daubert Justice Blackmun focused on the meaning of "knowledge"
in Rule 702.129 He posed an essentially epistemological question: How
can an investigator use Newtonian scientific methodology to come to
know whether an hypothesis about a phenomenon is true?3 o When a
scientist makes an assertion about a phenomenon, he or she is making
a knowledge claim; epistemology requires an adequate basis or warrant
for the claim.' 3 1 Under the Daubert line of authority, the trial judge
must demand that the expert's proponent lay a sufficient foundation to

124. E.g., Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standardsfor Admitting Expert
Evidence in FederalCivil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L.
251 (2002).
125. 509 U.S. at 588-89.
126. 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
127. Id. at 455.
128. 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1.15, at 45-46 (2009-2010 ed.).
129. 509 U.S. at 590.
130. Imwinkelried, The Next Step, supra note 88, at 2277.
131. ALBUREY CASTELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY 169 (2d ed. 1963).
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validate the claim.132 To assess the sufficiency of the foundation, in
sequence the trial judge ought to address three questions."as
Question #1: What is the specific theory or technique that the expert
proposes to rely on as the basis for his or her opinion?
It is not enough for the expert to explain that he or she is resting the
opinion on his or her education or experience. In General Electric Co. v.
Joiner' and Kumho, the Court said in no uncertain terms that the
expert's ipse dixit assertion is an inadequate foundation.'35 If the
basis of the expert's opinion is ineffable and inarticulable, it cannot
qualify as "knowledge" under Rule 702. Further, the trilogy of Supreme
Court decisions demonstrates that the question is not about the global
validity of the expert's discipline.'36 In each opinion, the Court's
analysis was highly particularized.
In the first decision in the trilogy, the original Daubert case, Justice
Blackmun stated that the proponent's foundation must satisfy the trial
judge that the expert's theory or technique is sufficiently reliable to
perform "the task at hand.""' The issue was not the overall standing
of the discipline of epidemiology. Rather, the question was the validity
of the metanalysis the plaintiffs' experts had conducted to validate the
hypothesis that a mother's ingestion of Bendectin in the first trimester
can cause the mother's child to suffer limb defects. Thirty published
studies had investigated the question of whether Bendectin is a human
teratogen. None of those studies had found a statistically significant
correlation between Bendectin ingestion and limb defects. However, the
plaintiffs' experts had pooled the data from the studies, reanalyzed the
data, and teased a statistically significant finding out of the metanalysis.x1s The litigants did not waste any time disputing whether epidemiology is a recognized scientific discipline. Their focus was much
sharper, concentrated on the metanalysis submitted by the plaintiffs.
Joiner lends itself to the same interpretation as Daubert. In Joiner
Chief Justice Rehnquist analyzed the question of whether the animal

132. Daubert,509 U.S. at 597.
133. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaningof "AppropriateValidation"
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Interpreted in Light of the Broader
RationalistTradition,Not the Narrow Scientific Tradition,30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 74964 (2003).
134. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
135. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 157-58; Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
136. See D. Michael Risinger, Defining the "Task at Hand"- Non-Science Forensic
Science After Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 769-71 (2000).
137. 509 U.S. at 597.
138. Id. at 582-84.
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studies cited by the plaintiff were an adequate basis for the expert's
139
The Chief
opinion as to the cause of Joiner's small-cell lung cancer.
14 0
The
studies.
animal
the
of
Justice initially catalogued the criticisms
Chief Justice then wrote:
[Plaintiff] failed to reply to this criticism. Rather than explaining how
and why the experts could have extrapolated their opinions from these
seemingly far-removed animal studies, [plaintiffl chose "to proceed as
if the only issue [was] whether animal studies can ever be a proper
foundation for an expert's opinion." Of course, whether animal studies
can ever be a proper foundation for an expert's opinion was not the
issue. The issue was whether these experts' opinions were sufficiently
supported by the animal studies on which they purported to rely.'"'

The Kumho opinion is cast in the same mold. Kumho echoes Daubert's
reference to "the task at hand." 4 2 In reviewing the foundation laid by
the plaintiffs for Carlson's expert opinion, Justice Breyer narrowly
defined the question presented as follows:
[Clontrary to [plaintiffs'] suggestion, the specific issue before the [trial]
court was not the reasonableness in general of a tire expert's use of a
visual and tactile inspection to determine whether overdeflection had
caused the tire's tread to separate from its steel-belted carcass.
Rather, it was the reasonableness of using such an approach, along
with Carlson's particular method of analyzing the data thereby

obtained, to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter to which
the expert testimony was directly relevant. 43
Carlson had not rested his opinion simply on the general theory that,
absent evidence of abuse, a defect will normally be the cause of a tire's
separation. Rather, he had developed a more specific theory to establish
the existence or absence of abuse.'" Still later, Justice Breyer underscored that "the question before the trial court was specific, not
general.' 45
This approach makes epistemological sense. At any given time in a
discipline, the propositions circulating will vary widely in the extent of
the supporting validation.'" Some may be so well established that

139. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 144.

140. Id.
141. Id. (third alteration in original) (citation omitted).

142. 526 U.S. at 141.
143. Id. at 153-54 (emphasis omitted).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 156.
146. Imwinkelried, Appropriate Validation, supra note 133, at 742-43.
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4 7 others might have barely enough
they are judicially noticeable,1
validating research to pass muster, still others will lack adequate
validation, and some may be flatly at odds with a massive amount of
research. It makes little sense to discuss the general validity of the
discipline. Daubert,Joiner,and Kumho are correct in directing the trial
judge to demand that the expert identify the specific theory or technique
he or she contemplates using.

Question #2: To what particularuse orpurpose does the expert propose
putting the specific technique?
To be admissible, any item of evidence must be logically relevant.'"
Suppose that at trial, the opponent objected to the relevance of the
testimony by the proponent's expert. The typical trial judge would not
be content with the proponent's bald assertion that the testimony about
the theory was "relevant." The judge would likely respond, "Tell me
what fact of consequence this testimony is relevant to, and explain how
the testimony is relevant to that fact." In Daubert Justice Blackmun
went to the brink of explicitly identifying the second step in the analysis.
He wrote that the testimony about the validation research must "fit":
"Fit" is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not
necessarily scientific validity for other[ ... purposes. The study of the
phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid scientific "knowledge" about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact
in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However (absent
creditable grounds supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was
full on a certain night will not assist the trier of fact in determining
whether an individual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night. 4 9
Even before Daubert, some courts perceived the importance of this
inquiry. In a prior decision, the Missouri Supreme Court had approved
of the use of neutron activation analysis (NAA) to determine whether a
crime scene hair sample and the accused's hair had similar elemental
composition.5 o However, the court refused to accept NAA testimony
comparing a crime scene blood sample and a sample of the accused's
blood.'
The research validating the use of NAA to identify hair could
not be stretched to uphold the use of NAA for an entirely different

147. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.11.
148. FED. R. EvID. 401.
149. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (citation omitted).
150. State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368, 371-72 (Mo. 1972).
151. Id. at 371.
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purpose.152 Likewise, in an earlier case the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that rape trauma syndrome (RTS) had been adequately validated
as a diagnostic tool to determine whether a rape complainant was
Nevertheless, the court
suffering from a particular mental disorder."
refused to permit prosecutors to treat the complainant's RTS as
substantive evidence that a rape had occurred.154
Once again the courts reached the right epistemological conclusion.
The assertion that RTS enables an expert to determine whether a
complainant has a certain state of mind is an entirely different
knowledge claim than the assertion that RTS permits the expert to
determine whether the complainant has been raped. Empirical data
sufficient to support one knowledge claim may be a woefully inadequate
warrant for a different knowledge claim. Thus, just as the trial judge
must press the expert to articulate the specific theory or technique they
intend to use, the judge should insist that the expert identify the
purpose or use of the theory. For instance, does the expert ultimately
want to draw an inference as to someone's credibility, or does the expert
intend to testify to a conclusion as to whether some event occurred in the
external world?.5 5
Question #3: Has the expert presented enough methodologically sound
empirical reasoningto validate that particularuse of the specific theory?
The first question relates to which technique the expert is using. The
second concerns why the proponent is offering the testimony about the
technique. The third and final question is the critical one: How should
the proponent validate that particular use of that specific theory? The
answers to the first two questions specify the content of the hypothesis
to be validated, and now the judge must assess the adequacy of the
validation. At first blush this question may seem intimidating to a judge
who lacks a Bachelor of Science degree. However, it is worth remembering Sir Karl Popper's observation that the scientific method is essentially
"common-sense knowledge writ large."156

152. Id. at 371-72.
153. State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232, 233 (Minn. 1982).
154. Id.; State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Minn. 1982).
155. If the expert does not specify the use, the wording of his or her final opinion is
usually the best clue. For instance, if the rape crisis center expert proposes testifying to
a final opinion that the complainant honestly believed that she had been raped although
she delayed reporting the rape, the theory of logical relevance is credibility. However,
when the expert contemplates opining that there was a rape, the expert is putting the
theory to substantive use.
156. KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF ScIENTIFIc DISCOVERY 22 (1959) (emphasis omitted).
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That common sense is evident in the Daubert line of authority. In the
initial Daubert decision, Justice Blackmun stressed the soundness of the
expert's methodology: "The focus, of course, must be solely on principles
and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate."' As the
Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 2000 amendment to Rule
702 states, the judge's task is to inquire as to the methodological
soundness of the expert's validation of the theory or technique, not the
correctness of the expert's opinion.' Joiner refined and elaborated on
the Daubert analysis. Under Joinerthe judge should not limit his or her
analysis to the soundness of the expert's methodology; rather, the judge
must also inquire whether there is enough methodologically sound
research to support the expert's final conclusion:
Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. But nothing
in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district
court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only
by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is
simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion

proffered.15 9

Epistemology mandates this final analytic step. In epistemology the
crucial question is not whether there is some support for a knowledge
claim. Rather, the decisive issue is whether there is enough or adequate
support for the claim. Neither an epistemologist nor a trial judge is
obliged to accept a person's assertion that specified data validates the
claim. Both the epistemologist and the judge are entitled to employ
their own experience and sense of logic to independently assess the
connection between the claim and the supposed basis or warrant.
As previously stated, under the Frye regime the courts adopted a
largely laissez-faire attitude toward nonscientific expertise because they
found it so difficult to adapt the general acceptance standard to the
evaluation of such expertise. However, the three-step analysis under
Daubert-Kumho is flexible enough to enable judges to evaluate the
reliability of even nonscientific expert testimony. Suppose, for example,
that in a contract dispute between two members of the same industry,
the outcome turns on the interpretation of the expression, "50%protein,"
in the written agreement.6 o The plaintiff calls an expert to opine that
in that industry, there is a linguistic convention that any seller's

157. 509 U.S. at 595.
158. FED. R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee's Note.
159. 522 U.S. at 146.
160. E.g., Hurst v. W.J. Lake & Co., 16 P.2d 627, 628 (Or. 1932) (internal quotations
omitted).
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shipment exceeding 49.5% protein is deemed to satisfy a "50%protein"
contract requirement. The opinion is a knowledge claim. The expert is
There would be
drawing on and summarizing his or her experience.'
a sufficient warrant for that claim if the proponent's foundation
established that the witness had participated in a large number of
transactions involving the expression "50%protein" within the industry
and that in those transactions, the buyers usually accepted any
shipment exceeding 49.5% protein.
Or suppose that in a criminal case, the prosecutor calls a police officer,
the handler of a trained narcotics detection dog, to testify that there
were drugs in the accused's vehicle because the dog alerted the police
officer to the vehicle. Here too, the witness is making a knowledge
claim. However, the claim differs radically from the claim in the
previous hypothetical. In this hypothetical, the officer is claiming that
he or she knows that the vehicle contained contraband drugs because the
dog behaved in a certain way. To justify that claim, the proponent must
demonstrate the dog's record of success.162 In the officer's experience,
how often has the dog "alerted" in that manner? In what percentage of
those cases was there a follow-up search, and what percentage of those
searches yielded drugs?" In the macrocosm, we have faith in science
for the pragmatic reason that we have witnessed an "immense body of
results," successful applications of scientific theories and techniques."
In the microcosm of this hypothetical, an epistemologist would accept the
officer's knowledge claim only if the officer demonstrates that prior
experiences with the dog show that, based on the dog's alert, the officer
can accurately determine whether a vehicle contains illegal
drugs-simply stated, the results of the prior uses of the technique.
III. THE UTILITY OF THE NEW APPROACH FOR DETERMINING THE
ADMISSIBLITY OF TESTIMONY BASED ON NEW BRAIN SCIENCE
THEORIES AND TECHNIQUES

Part II synthesized the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.165 case lRw to outline a new three-step approach to determining
the admissibility of expert testimony, whether that testimony rests on
hard science, soft science, or nonscientific expertise. Of course, given the

161. Imwinkelried, Appropriate Validation, supra note 133, at 753.
162. See United States v. Winters, 600 F.3d 963, 967-68 (8th Cir. 2010).
163. See Pappas v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 & n.16 (W.D. Pa. 2000)
(test for reliability of expert testimony grounded in part in success in employing the
method).
164. ZIMAN, supra note 87, at 6-7, 10.
165. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

20111

SERENDIPITOUS TIMING

981

topic of this Symposium, the vital question is whether that approach will
prove useful for assessing the reliability and admissibility of testimony
based on the new insights from the brain sciences. To explore that
question, we shall discuss two brain science techniques mentioned in the
introduction, EEG and BOLD fMRI. As we shall see, this discussion
illustrates how effectively the courts can apply the new approach to
breakthroughs in brain science.
Electroencephalography
To apply the new admissibility approach to EEG evidence, the initial
step is identifying the theory or technique being used. The obvious
answer is the EEG instrument. The next step is determining the
purpose for which the proponent is offering the testimony about the
technique. As the introduction suggested, there are several uses of the
EEG.
One use is to diagnose brain damage. Merging the answers to the first
two questions, the hypothesis to be investigated is whether the EEG can
be used to accurately diagnose the existence of certain types of brain
injury. It would be a straightforward matter to design an experimental
protocol to validate this hypothesis. A researcher might suspect that if
a particular region of the brain has suffered a certain type of injury, an
EEG will show brain waves of a certain timing and amplitude.16 6 To
establish the diagnostic specificity of those brain waves, the researcher
could test persons who display all the classic symptoms of the brain
injury and compare persons who manifest none of the symptoms.
Suppose that the comparison yielded the finding that EEGs of the
former group uniformly produced waves of that timing and amplitude
while none of the EEGs of the latter group recorded such waves. That
finding would lend strong support to the hypothesis. However, consider
another potential use of EEG. As the introduction pointed out, Dr.
Farwell's research concentrates on the use of EEG as a lie detector.'
Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) have provided funding to support research into
this use of EEG.'"
Once again, it is necessary to apply the new, Daubert-style analysis.
Merging the answers to the first two questions, there is a very different
hypothesis to study. The new hypothesis is whether EEG can be
employed to accurately determine whether a person is being untruthful

A.

166.

GORDON M. SHEPHERD, NEUROBIoLoGY 553 (3d ed. 1994).

167.

See supra text accompanying notes 3, 6, 7.

168. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-22, INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES: FEDERAL
AGENCY VIEWS ON THE POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF "BRAIN FINGERPRINTING" at 1 (2001).
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when he or she answers a particular question. Dr. Farwell has tendered
opinions based on this use of EEG in several cases. In an Iowa case,16 9
the accused applied for post-conviction relief. The accused argued that
there was newly discovered exculpatory evidence, including an EEG
examination, which Dr. Farwell contended demonstrated that the
accused lacked knowledge of essential facts of the crime.o70 The Iowa
Supreme Court granted relief, but did so on the ground of a due process
violation rather than Dr. Farwell's opinion.' 7 1 Although the court
mentioned Dr. Farwell's analysis in its opinion, it is unclear the extent,
if any, to which the EEG analysis influenced the court's decision. In a
2005 Oklahoma case,'172 an EEG examination was again submitted in
support of a petition for post-conviction relief."17 The judge refused to
consider the EEG results and stated that the testimony could probably
not survive a Daubert analysis.'7 4 Similarly, in 2009 a New Jersey
trial court rejected the use of EEG as a lie detector.171
It is understandable why the courts' reaction to this use of EEG has
been so unfavorable. While EEG is widely used to diagnose brain injury,
employing it to detect deception necessitates different validation.
Presumably, brain injuries automatically and involuntarily produce the
waves that are allegedly diagnostic. In contrast, this use of EEG relates
to conscious decisions to deceive. Positing EEG's ability to detect
involuntary, diagnostic waves hardly dictates the conclusion that EEG
can be used to accurately detect deliberate deception.
There are grave doubts about the adequacy of the validation for this
adaptation of EEG. One variation of the available research is a "guilty
knowledge" test.n7 The researchers theorize that if an interrogator
reveals a fact about the crime under investigation and the interogee
knows that fact, the interogee's recognition of the fact will produce a
certain type of brain wave. 77 However, some of the research findings
are discouraging. In one 2008 study in which the subjects were
instructed to use countermeasures to confuse the test, the subjects

169. Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 2003).
170. Id. at 512, 515-16 & n.6.
171. Id. at 525.
172. Slaughter v. State, 108 P.3d 1052 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
173. See id. at 1054.
174. Id.
175. State v. Bates, No. 34-2007, 2009 WL 981839, at *2 (N.J. Super. Mar. 23, 2009).
176. Lawrence A. Farwell & Emanuel Donchin, The Truth Will Out: Interrogative
Polygraphy ("Lie Detection") with Event-Related Brain Potentials,28 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY
531, 531 (1991).
177. See Ewout H. Meier et al., The P300 is Sensitive to ConcealedFace Recognition,
66 INT'L J. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 231, 231 (2007).
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employing the countermeasures were correctly classified only 7%-27% of
the time"ve--an accuracy rate far below random chance. The existence
of effective countermeasures is one of the leading reasons why in its
2003 report, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) expressed
skepticism about the adequacy of the empirical validation of polygraph's
If
accuracy as a technique for detecting conscious deception. 79
countermeasures can reduce the accuracy rate below 50%, any epistemologist or judge would be hard-pressed to conclude that there is a
sufficient proof or warrant for this knowledge claim.
B. Blood-Oxygenation-Level-Dependentfunctional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (BOLD fMRI)
Here too the new Daubert-style analytic framework is helpful in
separating the wheat from the chaff. Structural MRI produces extremely
detailed, static images of soft tissue. For its part, fMRI can visualize
changes such as brain activity that occur over time. BOLD fMRI is often
used to monitor such brain activity. The brain cannot store energy
locally. Rather, its activity depends on a regular blood flow to bring
The brain's dependence on a constant
fresh oxygen to its cells."
oxygen supply enables BOLD fMRI to indirectly detect neural activity.
Within a few seconds after the neurons in an area of the brain fire, that
area experiences an influx of highly oxygenated blood.'' Deoxygenated hemoglobin reduces the MRI signal. When the local ratio of
oxygenated to deoxygenated hemoglobin increases, more MRI signal will
be observed. 82 In other words, there will be a noticeable change in the
MRI signal in the area of the brain that activates. Although fMRI does
not directly measure neuronal activity, it detects changes in the
metabolic demands of active neurons. Like EEG, fMRI has been put to
several uses, posing varying challenges under Daubert.
As the introduction indicated, some researchers have used BOLD fMRI
Obviously, the surgeon
to identify surgical patients' vocal centers."
does not want to inadvertently damage a patient's language functions
while the surgeon is performing an unrelated operation. If a brain
178. Ralf Mertens & John J. B. Allen, The Role of Psychophysiology in Forensic
Assessments: Deception Detection, ERPs, and Virtual Reality Mock Crime Scenarios, 45
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 286, 293 (2008).
179. 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 21, § 8.03[e], at 436.
180. Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-BasedLie Detection: The Urgent Need
for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 380 (2007).
181. Henry T. Greely, Law and the Revolution in Neuroscience:An Early Look at the
Field,42 AKRON L. REv. 687, 694 (2009).
182. Id.
183. See supra text accompanying note 5.
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surgeon can identify a patient's vocal center in advance, he or she can
give the center a wide berth during the surgical procedure.
Suppose that after brain surgery, a patient experiences a loss of
language function. The patient sues the surgeon for malpractice and
alleges that the surgeon was guilty of professional negligence precisely
because the surgeon did not put BOLD fMRI to this use before beginning
the surgery. At trial, the plaintiff proffers testimony about this use of
fMRI. Should the judge admit the testimony? If we apply the analytic
framework outlined in Part II, the answer to the first question is BOLD
fMRI. The answer to the second question is the use of the technique to
identify the part of the patient's brain controlling vocal functions. Those
two answers specify the scientific hypothesis, that is, that the instrument can be used to accurately isolate the vocal center. A researcher
could marshal several types of experiments to convince a trial judge that
there is adequate validation for that hypothesis. To begin with, the
researcher could generate scans of the same person speaking and
remaining silent; the differences between the images ought to help the
researcher locate the person's vocal center. The researcher could
supplement that research with studies of the brain activity of mute
individuals. In addition, if the researcher could identify subjects who
were gradually losing speech function, the researchers could conduct a
longitudinal study to locate the brain areas where the MRI signal was
declining. Using common sense and a bit of creativity, a researcher
could fairly easily design a set of experiments that would satisfy any
epistemologist or trial judge that there is adequate support for the
knowledge claim.
The parallel to EEG brain science continues. The introduction noted
that as in the case of EEG, some fMRI researchers are endeavoring to
use the technique to detect conscious deception." The fMRI researchers are a bit behind the EEG researchers, because there have been less
than a handful of attempts to offer this testimony in court yet."a

184. Sean A. Spence et al., If Brain Scans Really Detected Deception, Who Would
Volunteer to be Scanned?, 55 J. FORENSIC ScI. 1352, 1352 (2010); see also supra text
accompanying note 3.
185. In May 2010, in the federal fraud prosecution of Lorne Semrau, the defense
endeavored to introduce fMRI testimony to negate the accused's intent to cheat. Greg
Miller, fMRI Lie Detection Failsa Legal Test, 328 SCIENCE, June 11, 2010, at 1336, 1336.
The defense attempted to introduce testimony about scans performed by Cephos. Federal
magistrate judge Tu Pham barred the testimony. On one hand, the judge found that the
underlying hypothesis is testable and acknowledged that there are several, peer-reviewed
articles discussing the use of fMRI for lie detection. On the other hand, he emphasized
that "t] here are no known error rates for fMRI-based lie detection outside the laboratory
setting, i.e. in the 'real world." Id. at 1337.
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There have been approximately twenty studies investigating this
adaptation of fMRI. 8 6 However, after surveying the data in these
studies, a trial judge who takes to heart the Court's caveat about
unjustified extrapolation... would think long and hard before holding
that there is sufficient basis for this knowledge claim. There are a
number of reasons for caution:
* Almost all the studies involve male Caucasians who neither suffer
from mental illness nor use illicit drugs. In both respects, the
database does not represent the universe of persons who tend to
populate American prisons.'8 s
* While some studies report an impressive overall accuracy of 90%,1s"
others found a specificity of only 42%.'90 To some extent, interlaboratory variation is expectable because laboratories at the cutting edge of
pioneering research often use different study designs. What is more
disturbing, however, is that on occasion individual laboratories have
encountered difficulty replicating their own prior results.'
* In all the published studies, the subjects are instructed to lie. It is
possible that the signal detected is prompted by the decision to comply
with the instruction rather than a choice to deceive. The researcher
is extrapolating from data involving compelled deceit to situations in
which the subject voluntarily chooses to lie.
* The design of the published studies is artificial, because the test
subject has little incentive to avoid detection. It is true that in some
studies, the subject receives a monetary reward if he or she succeeds
in concealing the deception from the researcher. However, those
incentives pale in comparison to the incentive of a criminal to lie to
prevent conviction or of a spy to lie to avoid being exposed.
* There has been even less investigation of the vulnerability of fMRI to
countermeasures than there has been in the case of EEG.

186. Spence, supra note 184, at 1352.
187. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
188. See John Seabrook, Suffering Souls: The Searchfor the Roots ofPsychopathy, NEW
YORKER, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/11/10081110/fa.fact
seabrook?currentPage=all.
189. F. Andrew Kozel et al., DetectingDeception Using FunctionalMagnetic Resonance
Imaging, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 605, 605 (2005).
190. F. Andrew Kozel et al., FunctionalMRI Detection ofDeception After Committing
a Mock Sabotage Crime, 54 J. FORENSIC Scl. 220, 226 (2008).
191. Daniel D. Langleben et al., Telling Truth From Lie in Individual Subjects with
Fast Event-Related fMRI, 26 HuM. BRAIN MAPPING 262, 270 (2005); Sean A. Spence,
Playing Devil's Advocate: The Case Against fMRI Lie Detection, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCH. 11, 11 (2008).
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In this light, an epistemologist could quite consistently conclude that
there is sufficient warrant for the knowledge claim with respect to the
identification of patients' voice center but patently inadequate warrant
for the claim regarding deception detection.'92
IV.

CONCLUSION

Hopefully, the reader will come away from this Article with two
impressions. The first is that at its base, the new Daubert-Kumho
framework for analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony is an
epistemological approach. An expert appearing at trial is making a
knowledge claim. Like an epistemologist, the trial judge should demand
clear answers to the three questions identified in Part II. The second
impression is that this new epistemological approach will be useful in
determining which products of the new brain sciences should be used
during the adjudicative'9 3 process in the courtroom.
Of course, we should not understate the difficulty of this undertaking.
Because of the exemptions from the Frye test, modern courts following
the Daubert-Kumho line of authority are writing on a tabula raza; they
are endeavoring to critically evaluate the validity of theories and
techniques that escaped scrutiny under Frye. A forte of the common law
is its ability to accumulate judicial experience with a legal doctrine and
to capitalize on that experience to reform the doctrine.'" However, the
exemptions denied the courts the opportunity to gain experience dealing
with soft science and nonscientific expertise. Given the court's observation in McDonald about "medical" testimony, it is conceivable that even
today some courts following Frye would admit testimony about new brain
science techniques without meaningfully scrutinizing the techniques.
However, as Part III of this Article demonstrated, the epistemological
mindset implicit in the Daubert line will serve the courts well when they
are asked to assess the knowledge claims made by brain scientists.
The courts will not only have to face the short-term challenge of
passing on the admissibility of testimony based on the theories and
192. See Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie
Detection, and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 1191-1210 (2009).
193. Again, the formal rules of evidence such as Rule 702 and Daubert are not applied
as strictly when the litigator uses brain science data for a normative or legislative purpose
rather than an adjudicative one. See supra text accompanying notes 10-17. Likewise,
many jurisdictions apply more relaxed evidentiary rules at the sentencing phase. Neuroscience evidence is sometimes proffered during sentencing. See Scott N. MacMillan & Michael
S. Vaughn, Weighing the Evidence: Neuroimagery Evidence of Brain Trauma or Disorder
in Courts, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 495, 500-01 (2010).
194. PAUL J. MISHKIN & CLARENCE MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS: AN INTRODUCTION To
JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF CASE AND STATUTE LAw 230 (1965).
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techniques that the brain sciences produce in the near future. In
addition, the courts must be prepared to revisit these issues. In
epistemology, the ultimate question is always the adequacy of the
warrant for the knowledge claim.195 Worldwide, brain researchers are
generating new data at a breathtaking pace. That new data can either
strengthen a warrant previously deemed inadequate or undermine a
warrant formerly considered sufficient. When a knowledge claim rests
on empirical data and the state of the data changes, the court must be
ready to rethink the admissibility of testimony based on the claim. It is
serendipity that the advent of the Daubert line of cases roughly
coincided with the emergence of the new brain sciences. However, it
would be a mistake to think that the initial Daubert rulings made on
new brain science techniques will settle the admissibility issues once and
for all. Especially in areas such as contemporary brain science, the
empirical research is ongoing and dynamic. Given the evolving nature
of the research, an epistemologist cannot make a truly definitive
pronouncement on the validity of the theory,"' nor can a trial judge
who understands the fundamentally epistemological nature of the
Daubert standard.

195. CASTELL, supra note 131, at 169.
196. Brief for the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the
National Academy of Sciences as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102), 1993 WL13006381.
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